CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE ACTION No LONGER A REQUISITE
UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)-Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88
(1971).
Plaintiffs, black citizens of Mississippi, filed an action for damages
against certain white citizens who allegedly conspired to deprive them
of their right to equal protection of the laws by force, violence and
intimidation. The plaintiffs, together with R.G. Grady, were traveling
upon the federal, state and local highways in and about De Kalb,
Mississippi, when the defendants, believing Grady to be a civil rights
worker, forced plaintiffs to stop by driving a truck across their path.
They then forced Grady and the other plaintiffs out of the car, held
them at gunpoint and seriously injured each by clubbing them with
pipes and blackjacks. 1
The plaintiffs brought their action in federal court based on 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970) which provides in part:
If two or more persons ...

conspire or go in disguise on the

highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving . . . any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws ...
the party so injured or deprived may have an action.., against,..
2
the conspirators.

The district court, relying on Collins v. Hardyman,3 dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, deciding that section 1985(3) did not encompass private
1 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 90-91 (1971).
2 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970) provides in full:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise
on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving,
either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for
the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State
or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to
prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled
to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in
favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President
or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure
any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in
any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engage
therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States,
the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
8 341 US. 651 (1951).

NOTES
conspiracies, and the court of appeals affirmed. 4 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari 5 and reversed the lower court's decision," holding
that section 1985(3) does not require state action but reaches private
conspiracies aimed at invidiously discriminatory deprivations of the
equal enjoyment of rights secured to all.7 Thus Griffin v. Breckenridge,
by dispensing with the "state action" requirement previously deemed
essential in Collins, has greatly expanded the protection afforded by 42

U.S.C. § 1985(3).
Section 1985(3) was originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights
Act of 18718 and was an attempt to insure protection of the rights
afforded by the Constitution to the newly freed slaves. It was popularly
known as the Ku Klux Klan Act and was a response to a message sent
to Congress on March 23, 1871, by President Grant,9 asking for additional legislation to curb violence in the South because of the inability
of state authorities to control it. The congressional supporters of the
Act asserted that the Klan was a multi-state conspiracy of a military
nature whose mode of operation was to commit murder and other acts
of violence.' 0
When thousands of murders and outrages have been committed
in the southern States and not a single offender brought to justice,
when the State courts are notoriously powerless to protect life, person, and property, and when violence and lawlessness are universally prevalent, the denial of the equal protection of the laws is
too clear to admit of question or controversy. Full force and effect
is therefore given to section five [of the fourteenth amendment]
which declares that "Congress shall have power to enforce by
appropriate legislation the provisions of this article."'"
Through these actions, the Ku Klux Klan effectively neutralized
law enforcement officials and created an atmosphere of lawlessness
which was so prevalent that it resulted in a denial of equal protection.
The failure to afford protection equally to all is a denial of it.
4 410 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969).

5 397 U.S. 1074 (1970).
6 403 U.S. at 107.
7 Id. at 102-04.
8 Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13.
9 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 236 (1871).
10 Id. at 153-54 (remarks of Senator Sherman).
11 Id. at 322 (remarks of Representative Stoughton). For a discussion
as constituting a denial of equal protection, see Abernathy, Expansion of
Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375, 412-17
What Is "State" Action Under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth
the Constitution?, 24 ORE. L. REv. 227, 232-33 (1945).
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Affirmative action or legislation is not the only method of a
denial of protection by a State, State action not being always legislative action. A State may by positive enactment cut off from some
the right to vote . . . and many other such things. This positive
denial of protection is no more flagrant or odious or dangerous
than to allow certain persons to be outraged as to their property,
safety, liberty, or life; than to overlook offenders in such cases; than
to utterly disregard the sufferer and his persecutor, and treat the
one as a nonentity and the other as a good citizen .... A systematic
failure to make arrests, to put on trial, to convict, or to punish
offenders against the rights of a great class of citizens is a denial of
equal protection in the eye of reason and the law, and justifies, yes,
loudly demands, the active interference of the only power that can
give it.12
In Collins the Court held that section 1985(3) only applied to
situations involving state action. 13 In that case the plaintiffs had formed
a political club for the purpose of engaging in public meetings for
the discussion of national issues. Such a meeting had been planned
for November 14, 1947 when a resolution opposing the Marshall
Plan was to be adopted and forwarded to appropriate federal officials.' 4 At this meeting, the defendants, private individuals, assaulted
and intimidated plaintiffs, thus interfering with their right to petition
the government for the redress of grievances and depriving them, as
citizens, of equal privileges and immunities under the laws of the
United States. Their complaint, however, made no claim that the conspiracy, or the overt acts, involved any action by state officials, or that
the defendants acted under color of state law.' 5 The Court assumed,
without deciding, that plaintiffs had been deprived of some federal
right, but distinguished this from being deprived of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws, as required by the Act. Because there was no showing that the
conspiracy was for the purpose of depriving plaintiffs of such protection, or of such privileges and immunities, the Court held that
defendants' conduct did not come within the ambit of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3).16
12 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 9, at 459 (remarks of Representative Coburn). For a
more detailed discussion of the congressional debates preceding the passage of the Ku
Klux Klan Act, see Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on State
Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 331 (1967).
13 341 U.S. at 661.
14 Id. at 653.
15 Id. at 654-55.

16 Id. at 661-62.
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The controversy over the applicability of section 1985(3) to private conspiracies is brought into focus by a comparison of the Griffin
and Collins cases. In Collins, the purpose of the Act was found to be
the enforcement of the fourteenth amendment in the South during
Reconstruction, and therefore required state action;' 7 whereas Griffin
found that Congress intended the Act to reach private conspiracies,
free from any state action requirement.'
The Court in Collins relied upon the language of the Act which
incorporates language from the fourteenth amendment together with
the official title of the Act-An Act to enforce the Provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and
for other Purposes-as indicating that the bill was designed to reach
state action and not private conspiracies.' 9 Although it recognized
that private action might come within the purview of the Act, such
activities would have to be so massive and widespread that they were
tantamount to state action.
We do not say that no conspiracy by private individuals could
be of such magnitude and effect as to work a deprivation of equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
laws. Indeed, the post-Civil War Ku Klux Klan, against which
this Act was fashioned, may have, or may reasonably have been
thought to have, done so. It is estimated to have had a membership of around 550,000 .... It may well be that a conspiracy, so
far-flung and embracing such numbers . .. was able effectively to
deprive Negroes of their legal rights and to close all avenues of redress or vindication .... But here nothing of that sort appears. We
have a case of a lawless political brawl, precipitated by a handful
20
of white citizens against other white citizens.
This view is supported in United States v. Harris21 where REV.
STAT. § 5519,22 the criminal section of the Klan Act, was declared unconstitutional. At that time (1882) the Court could find no basis in
either the fourteenth amendment or the privileges and immunities
clause of article IV 23 of the Constitution for federal legislation punish17 Id. at 656.

Is 403 U.S. at 101.
19 341 U.S. at 656-58.
20

Id. at 662.

106 U.S. 629 (1882).
As a result of the compilation of the Revised Statutes in 1878, Act of March 9,
1878, ch. 26, 20 Stat. 27, the Ku Klux Klan Act was separated into REV. STAT. §§ 1977
et seq. (1878) and REv. STAT. §§ 5506 et seq. (1878). The provisions of both were substantially the same except that the latter created criminal sanctions while the former provided
for civil liability.
21
22
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ing private conspiracies, 24 since both provisions require state action. 25

Griffin, however, in analyzing the other provisions of the Act and
the congressional debates preceding its passage, concluded that it did
reach private conspiracies aimed at depriving citizens of the equal
protection of the laws. 26 After noting that other sections of the Act
dealt explicitly with (1) action under color of state law, (2) interference with state authorities, and (3) a massive conspiracy supplanting
the authority of the state; the Court found that to impose these same
limitations on section 1985(3) would be to make the section superfluous. 27 Additionally, the Court pointed out that "going in disguise"
is an activity which is rarely associated with official action and com28
monly connected with the activities of private marauders.
Assuming that Congress intended the Act to apply to private
individuals, the question remains whether, given the circumstances
surrounding the passage of the Act, Congress intended it to apply to
the type of private conspiracy alleged in Griffin and Collins. However,
in light of the Griffin Court's determination that section 1985(3) does
apply to these conspiracies, the problem then became one of locating
a constitutional basis on which to uphold the section.
One of the constitutional sources the Court utilized to sustain
the validity of section 1985(3) was the thirteenth amendment,2 9 which
23 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2 provides:
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities
of Citizens in the several States.
24 106 U.S. at 639, 643.
25 The proposition that a denial of equal protection must come from the state was
settled in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883), where the Court said:
It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual
invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [fourteenth] amendment. . . . It nullifies and makes void all State legislation, and State action of
every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property without due process of
law, or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws.
Accord, Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 169 (1970); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S.
157, 177-78 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875).
The privileges and immunities which are guaranteed by art. IV § 2 are guaranteed
only against oppressive state action. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 766 (1966)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 511
(1939); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 295 (1920).
26 403 U.S. at 99-101.
27 Id. at 98-99. Specifically the Court referred to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) which expressly requires that the deprivation must be inflicted under color of state law.
28 Id. at 96.
29 Id. at 105. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 provides:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
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has been liberally interpreted to give Congress broad power to abolish
all forms of slavery and involuntary servitude.30 In Clyatt v. United
States,3 ' the Supreme Court established that this amendment does not
require state action; it applies to the acts of private individuals as
well as those of the federal and state governments. In that case the
Court upheld a statute abolishing peonage in New Mexico acknowledging that the thirteenth amendment "names no party or authority"
and condemns the institution of slavery regardless of the "manner
32
or authority by which it is created."
The applicability of the thirteenth amendment to legislation
which forbids private discrimination in the use and enjoyment of
inns, public conveyances, theatres, and places of public amusement
was discussed in 1883 in the Civil Rights Cases.33 Although this type
of discrimination was found not to inflict any manner of servitude
or a form of slavery, 34 the Court recognized that this amendment
is not strictly limited to nullifying state laws establishing or upholding
slavery, but
it has a reflex character also, establishing and decreeing universal
civil and political freedom throughout the United States; and it is
assumed, that the power vested in Congress to enforce the article
by appropriate legislation, clothes Congress with power to pass all
laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents
of slavery in the United States . . .35
In Jones v. Mayer Co.,36 the Supreme Court found-inherent in
the amendment-the power of Congress to determine what these badges
and incidents are.3 7 In upholding the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1970), which guarantees to Negroes the right to purchase real
property, the Court affirmed the assertion that "the badges and inciwhereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
80 Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968).

81 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
32 Id. at 216.
83 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
34 Id. at 24-25.
85 Id. at 20. In his dissent, Justice
stating that:
[T]he power of Congress under the
to the extent, at least, of protecting
respect of legal rights belonging to

upon race.
Id. at 37.
86 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
ST Id. at 439-40.

Harlan went even further than the majority by
Thirteenth Amendment . . . may be exerted
the liberated race against discrimination, in
freemen, where such discrimination is based
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dents of slavery ...[include] 'those fundamental rights which are the
essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right . . .to inherit, pur-

chase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.' "38
To this list, Griffin has now indicated there must be included acts
of physical violence if engendered by a racial purpose and with the
design to deprive Negro citizens "of the basic rights that the law
secures to all free men. 39
Another basis on which the Court relied in upholding section
1985(3) was the right of interstate travel. In addition to being one of
the "rights and privileges of National citizenship, ' 40 the right to unrestricted interstate travel is "assertable against private as well as
governmental interference.''41

Although the Court failed to indicate the constitutional origin
of this right, prior cases have suggested two possible sources-the privi42
leges and immunities clause of article IV and the commerce clause.
The rationale for designating this right as a privilege and immunity of national citizenship was explained by Justice Harlan in his
separate opinion in United States v. Guest.43 He asserted that the
right of interstate travel has long been declared a privilege and immunity of national citizenship "[b]ecause of the close proximity of the
right of ingress and regress to the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the Articles of Confederation . . . . 44He suggests that the reason
this right was not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution was because "it was so obviously an essential part of our federal structure
that it was necessarily subsumed under more general clauses of the
Constitution. '45 However, the difficulty in designating this clause as
the source of this right, and therefore one of the bases of section 1985
(3), is the same difficulty which is encountered by using the fourteenth
amendment. Both provisions require state action 46 and therefore could
not support a private conspiracy like the one alleged in Griffin.
By utilizing the commerce clause as the genesis for the right of
interstate travel, there is no difficulty with a "state action" requirement
Id. at 441.
403 U.S. at 105.
Id. at 106 (quoting from Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908)).
41 Id. at 105.
42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides:
The Congress shall have the power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.
43 383 U.S. 745, 762 (1966) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44 Id. at 764.
45 Id.
46 See cases cited note 25 supra.
38

39
40
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since Congress' power under this clause is plenary. 47 This clause not
only includes commercial intercourse with foreign nations and among
the several states, 48 but also encompasses interstate travel by private
49
persons regardless of the non-existence of a commercial purpose.
The transportation of passengers in interstate commerce, it
has long been settled, is within the regulatory power of Congress,
under the commerce clause of the Constitution, and the authority
of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from
immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is
no longer open to question.50
The breadth of Congress' power under this clause is not limited to
situations involving direct interference with interstate commerce. 51 As
was enunciated in Katzenbach v. McClung,5 2 an activity comes within
the power of Congress under the commerce clause if it has a substan53
tial effect on interstate commerce even if it be intrastate in nature.
By finding a constitutional basis for section 1985(3) in both the
thirteenth amendment and the commerce clause, the Court has apparently solved the problem of a state action requirement in that
statute. The power of Congress to punish conspiracies depriving citizens of thirteenth amendment rights or the right of interstate travel
is incontestable. However, the Court failed to meet squarely the problem of the fourteenth amendment language of section 1985(3): how
can private individuals deprive other private individuals of equal protection of the laws? Assuming that defendants have deprived plain47 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), both upholding title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970) which prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation.
48 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824).
49 E.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (statute making it a misdemeanor
to bring a nonresident "indigent person" held invalid as an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce); Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204 (1894)
(state law fixing rate of tolls on bridge between two states is unconstitutional); Gloucester
Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196 (1885) (state tax on ferry company held to be
unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 35 (1867) (state tax on persons leaving state by common carrier held unconstitutional).
50 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917); accord, United States v. Hoke,
227 U.S. 308 (1913) (act proscribing transportation of persons for immoral purposes held
to be constitutional exercise of congressional power to regulate commerce).
51 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123-24 (1942); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 119-20 (1941); Railroad Comm'n of Wis. v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R., 257 U.S. 563, 588 (1922); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1970); Deyo
v. United States, 396 F.2d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1968).
52 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
0 Id. at 297.
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tiffs of thirteenth amendment rights and the right of interstate travel,
have plaintiffs, in fact, been deprived of the equal protection of the
laws? This problem was plainly recognized in Collins, where the Court
stated that even if plaintiffs had been deprived of a federally guaranteed right, such a deprivation did not constitute a denial of the equal
54
protection of the laws.
What we have here is not a conspiracy to affect in any way these
plaintiffs' equality of protection by the law, or their equality of
privileges and immunities under the law ....
The only inequality
suggested is that the defendants broke up plaintiffs' meeting and
did not break up meetings of others with whose sentiments they
agreed. To be sure, this is not equal injury, but it is no more a
deprivation of "equal protection" or of "equal privileges and immunities" than it would be for one to assault one neighbor without assaulting them all .... Plaintiffs' rights were certainly invaded,
disregarded and lawlessly violated, but neither their rights nor their
equality of rights under the law have been, or were intended to be,
denied or impaired. Their rights under the laws and to protection
of the laws remain untouched and equal to ... those of any other
citizen who suffers violence at the hands of a mob. 55
In rejecting the idea that private individuals cannot deprive a
person of the equal protection of the laws and adopting the position
that "there is nothing inherent in the phrase that requires the action
working the deprivation to come from the State,"56 the Griffin Court
57
cited the case of United States v. Harris.
Although Harris discussed
58
this proposition, its reasoning and ultimate holding are exactly opposite to that in Griffin. In finding unconstitutional a criminal statute
identical to section 1985(3), the Court in Harris recognized the serious
difficulties which would arise if such a statute were upheld. 59 It determined that "[t]he only way . . . one private person can deprive
another of the equal protection of the laws is by the commission of
some offense against the laws which protect the rights of persons, as
by theft, burglary, arson, libel, assault, or murder." 60 Under this definition, any offense which invades a person's rights protected by either
state or federal law deprives a person of equal protection. Recognizing
the scope of this phrase and its implications on the federal-state juris54 341 U.S. at 660-61.
55 Id.
56

57
58

59
60

at 661-62.

403 U.S. at 97.
Id. (citing 106 U.S. 629 (1882)).
106 U.S. at 643.
Id. at 639-44.
Id. at 643 (emphasis added).
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dictional system, the Court found no constitutional provision on which
it could be upheld, 61 and specifically determined that the statute was
broader than the coverage of the thirteenth amendment 2-one of the
constitutional provisions on which the Griffin Court now relies.
The Griffin Court has both divorced the phrase "equal protection
of the laws" from the framework of the fourteenth amendment, where
it has been construed as a federal guarantee "against any encroachment
by the States upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member of society,"6 3 and conferred upon it its own definition:
The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or
equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some
racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory
64
animus behind the conspirators' action.
In doing so, the Court has accorded the words "equal protection of
the laws" a scope potentially as broad as that of the thirteenth amendment and commerce clause (or perhaps any right guaranteed by the
Constitution or laws of the United States). This marks a significant
encroachment by the federal government into areas previously reserved to the states. Although the Court ostensibly rejects the possibility of using this section as a general federal tort law, 65 anyone who
subscribes to the reasoning in Harris, cannot doubt that that is exactly
what they have done.
John F. Shoosmith, Jr.
61 Id. at 644.

Id. at 641.
63 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875).
64 403 US. at 102.
65 Id.
62

